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1 The recent economic and financial crisis 
had a significant negative impact on the Portu-
guese economy: throughout the period 2008–
2013, real GDP fell by more than 8 percent 
and the unemployment rate increased from 
8.7 percent to 16.4 percent of the labor force. 
More recently, the Portuguese economy has 
gradually begun to recover. GDP is expected to 
increase by 1.6 percent in 2015, and the unem-
ployment rate is forecast to decrease to around 
13 percent. Additionally, the huge external and 
budget imbalances registered during the crisis 
are being redressed. Although the numbers are 
still not particularly impressive, the current 
recovery shows a positive response to what has 
been a very difficult internal and external eco-
nomic environment. We owe this upturn to the 
swift implementation of a very ambitious pro-
gram of structural reform, flanked by a strong 
commitment to eliminate macroeconomic 
imbalances.
 It was toward the end of the Macroeco-
nomic Adjustment Program (2011–2014) that 
the Martindale Student Associates visited Por-
tugal to research the country’s economy. The 
Martindale Student Associates Program is an 
undergraduate research program developed by 
the Martindale Center at Lehigh University. It 
enables undergraduate students from across 
colleges and disciplines to study, in depth, the 
economies of countries whose cultures and 
institutional and economic parameters differ 
greatly from those of the USA. It is a fascinat-
ing exercise and a stimulating way for students 
to apply their academic knowledge in different 
applied set-ups. The students’ work culminated 
in the publication of this excellent journal that 
offers very interesting perspectives on Portu-
guese society and solid arguments and narra-
tives in support of their analyses. Congratula-
tions to the Martindale Student Associates and 
the Martindale Center team. 
Economic Overview
 Over the last 50 years, the Portuguese 
economy registered periods of very high growth 
rates, alternating with phases of dismal perfor-
mance, resulting in a balance of payments cri-
sis on three occasions. During the 1960s, the 
economy grew quickly and living standards 
increased significantly. In an effort to open its 
economy, Portugal joined the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA), with positive re-
sults in trading flows. However, the oil shocks 
of 1973 and 1979 inflicted huge costs on the 
economy, which was heavily dependent on im-
ported energy. On both occasions this severely 
upset the balance of payments and led to Por-
tugal’s request to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for a Macroeconomic Adjustment 
Program, or “bailout.” At this time, the Por-
tuguese economy was already fragile as it was 
emerging from 40 years of Salazar’s dictatori-
al regime. The termination of the dictatorship 
in 1974 and an uneven transition into a more 
market-based economy gave rise to substantial 
economic and social costs.
 Some of the more important challeng-
es the country faced during the 1970s in the 
aftermath of the 1974 Revolution include 1) 
changes to the economic system (the national-
ization of critical sectors), 2) the introduction 
of price controls, 3) increases in wages above 
productivity, and 4) the need to absorb a great 
many Portuguese citizens—around 500,000 
people—returning from former colonies. The 
following decade witnessed a gradual stabi-
lization of the economic, social, and political 
environment, mostly because institutions were 
adapting to the new environment and due to 
the fact that Portugal had joined the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1986. Portu-
gal’s increasing economic ties with the most 
developed nations in Europe helped usher the 
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2country into a new phase of prosperity.
 Another positive impulse came along in 
the mid-1990s with the perspective of Portugal 
joining the Eurozone at its inception (the sin-
gle currency came into existence in 1999). This 
expectation encouraged a rapid nominal con-
vergence and a drop in inflation and interest 
rates in alignment with levels enjoyed in core 
European countries. Increasingly integrated, 
the Portuguese economy began to follow the 
European cycle closely, with the convergence 
of real income. It is important to acknowledge, 
however, that the growth pattern during the 
1990s—especially in the second half—and in 
the 2000s was unsustainable in the sense that it 
was not (fundamentally) productivity-ground-
ed (supply side), but rather expenditure-based 
(demand side). As a result, the country’s in-
debtedness increased significantly, notably in 
terms of foreign investment liabilities.
 Portugal has, unquestionably, made enor-
mous progress over the past 40 years: in social 
areas (health and education), in infrastructure 
(roads, telecoms), and in the efficiency of the 
public sector (e-Gov). However, because some 
important economic sectors remained shel-
tered from competition (both internal and 
external), the economy was still unable to ad-
dress its chronic trade deficit. To sustain the 
increase in Portugal’s import levels (machin-
ery, consumption) during the boom periods, 
exports really needed to increase much faster 
than they did. I am not suggesting there was 
no increase in exports—there was. But Portu-
gal was facing an additional challenge during 
this period: globalization was pummeling a 
number of critical traditional sectors (textiles, 
footwear, and clothing)—a factor requiring 
even faster resource reallocation toward oth-
er, more dynamic sectors. Around this time, 
during the 2000s, China was joining the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), and several East-
ern European countries were joining the EU. 
All were competing in the same markets and 
with the same products in which Portugal had 
previously enjoyed a comparative advantage in 
international trade. Consecutive external defi-
cits brought about a rapid deterioration in the 
International Investment Position (IIP), which 
increased to more than 100 percent of GDP—
one of the highest in developed countries. The 
importance of these factors was downplayed 
by economists at the time, who argued for the 
irrelevance of current account deficits with-
in a monetary union. They felt that with no 
possibility of an attack on a country’s curren-
cy, speculators would be unable to generate a 
currency crisis and that the macroeconomic 
adjustment would occur automatically once 
other variables—namely labor and capital mo-
bility—shook down.
 Effectively, during the euro period, GDP 
was growing—albeit less than spectacularly. 
Moreover, belonging to a monetary union pro-
vided a certain sense of security. Meanwhile, 
as previously mentioned, the continued ac-
cumulation of external debt was increasing 
the country’s economic vulnerabilities. Risks 
materialized with the financial crisis of 2008, 
when the international shock was amplified 
by a lack of internal mechanisms that might 
have made it possible to implement some 
counter-cyclical policy measures. Budget defi-
cits and public debt—already elevated—in-
creased rapidly. Concurrently, the banking 
system became under-capitalized due to the 
crystallization of losses from non-performing 
loans. Facing significant need for external fi-
nancing, and with foreign investors fleeing 
to safer investments, much needed funding 
sources were drying up. Within this context, 
a sovereign debt crisis emerged in 2010, with 
Greece (May 2010), Ireland (November 2010), 
and Portugal (May 2011) applying for bailout 
programs. This time the European Commis-
sion (EC) and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) participated with the IMF as part of 
the institutional set-up, forming the so-called 
“troika” program. Although the depth of the 
problems facing these three countries was very 
different, they had one common characteristic: 
a significant amount of external debt. Although 
international investors were no longer able 
to speculate on the currencies of these three 
countries, they were still able to sell off their 
portfolios of sovereign debt en masse, gener-
ating a liquidity crisis, which rapidly became 
a crisis of solvency. Despite relative success in 
terms of convergence of real income to EU lev-
els over the last few decades, the fact remains 
that Portugal needed three Macroeconomic 
Adjustment Programs during this period, dis-
playing an inability within the country to plan 
for leaner times during times of plenty. 
3 It is common knowledge that Portuguese 
sailors and explorers were renowned in the 
15th and 16th centuries as being at the van-
guard of European overseas exploration. With 
an assumption of risk at the very heart of the 
Age of Discovery, they navigated the unknown, 
discovering and mapping the coasts of Afri-
ca, Canada, Asia, and Brazil. It is interesting, 
therefore, to reference Erin Burton’s article 
“The Impact of Risk Aversion on Economic De-
velopment in Portugal,” which examines how a 
nation’s attitude toward uncertainty can influ-
ence its economic performance.
The Macroeconomic Adjustment  
Program 2011–2014 (“Troika”)
 Portuguese external financing conditions 
deteriorated gradually throughout the period 
of the financial crisis and more so following 
the bailouts of Greece and Ireland. The govern-
ment, corporations, and banks began to lose 
their traditional investor base; even when it 
was still possible to tap international investors, 
interest rates sky-rocketed to the point that 
they became prohibitive. During the period 
1999–2007, the Portuguese Republic was able 
to gain access to finance in the internation-
al bond market, 10 basis points (0.1 percent) 
above Germany in tenures up to 10 years; in the 
peak of the crisis this spread was above 1,000 
basis points (10 percent). At the beginning of 
the crisis, the Portuguese banks and investors 
stepped in to replace international players, 
guaranteeing the necessary funds to maintain 
business as usual. However, the country’s ex-
cessive expenditure over its generated income 
(external deficit) was clearly unsustainable. In 
this context, a Memorandum of Understanding 
was signed in May 2011 between the Republic 
of Portugal and the “troika,” which included 
a set of measures—examined in Shaan Gur-
nani's paper, “The Financial Crisis in Portugal: 
Austerity in Perspective”—to be adopted over 
the following three years. These measures were 
to be coherent among themselves and self-en-
forcing, and should address macroeconom-
ic challenges in a way that would assure the 
country’s economic recovery. The Macroeco-
nomic Adjustment Program was built around 
three main pillars: 1) public finance sustain-
ability, 2) financial stability, and 3) structural 
reform. In terms of the public finance pillar, 
the aim was to reduce the general government 
deficit from 11 percent of GDP in 2010 to below 
3 percent of GDP (especially given that the ex-
isting elevated level of public debt—96 percent 
of GDP in 2010—was well above any measure 
of prudence). Next came a program specific 
to the banking sector aimed at guaranteeing 
the stability of the financial sector. The article 
“Banco Espírito Santo and European Banking 
Regulation” by Tyler Sloan rightly addresses 
this issue. Finally came the structural reform 
package, designed to increase the potential 
GDP growth rate—the most crucial long-term 
challenge facing the Portuguese economy. 
Portugal’s growth rate over the last 15 years 
has been lower than expected for a “catch-up” 
country. Several factors contribute to this low 
growth rate, the most prominent of which are 
low levels of competition and insufficient flex-
ibility. In this context, the structural reform 
program was based on measures designed, on 
the one hand, to increase the flexibility of the 
labor and product markets and, on the other, 
to improve the regulatory framework and con-
ditions promoting investment. Research from 
the IMF, the OECD, and the EC all show that 
delivering on these measures would signifi-
cantly increase potential GDP. 
The Path Going Forward
 Portugal exited the Macroeconomic Ad-
justment Program in June 2014, as expected, 
with an improved macroeconomic position: 
public finances were put in order, and the trade 
deficit was eliminated. The unemployment rate 
is decreasing, private consumption is return-
ing to more normal levels, and investment is 
picking up (although levels are still low, FDI 
is improving). Furthermore, investor confi-
dence returned to the Portuguese market: the 
government, banks, and corporations regained 
access to international markets. 
 One of the most important issues facing 
the Portuguese economy is the need to contin-
ue improving international competitiveness. 
The results over the last few years are very 
encouraging: exports have been increasing at 
high rates, with improving product and geo-
graphical diversification. The article “Portu-
gal and Its Former African Colonies: A Unique 
4Opportunity” by Jade van Streepen analyzes 
the links between Portugal and these former 
colonies, which have potential for further ex-
ploration and could yield mutual benefits.
 Investment is a crucial variable when 
it comes to increasing capital stock. Looking 
ahead, Portugal will need to make a special ef-
fort to enable new and innovative firms to en-
ter the market. Attracting foreign capital is also 
the motivation behind the Golden Visa Pro-
gram, the focus of the article “The Integration 
of Immigrants in Portugal” by Brandyn Bok.
 Investment in human capital is of par-
amount importance to increasing potential 
GDP. An analysis of this issue with interesting 
insights is addressed by Michael Gallucci in his 
article “Portuguese Emigration and the Brain 
Drain: The Power of Movement.”
 When it comes to areas of potential com-
parative advantage, the Martindale students 
focus on two promising sectors: Katherine 
Walters examines the field of biomedical R&D 
in her article “Enhancement of Research and 
Development in Portugal: Stimulation for In-
novation and the Economy,” while Whitney 
Challenger analyses the potential of the new 
maritime economy in her article “The Blue 
Economy: Opportunities Hidden at Sea.” 
 One of the unfortunate legacies of the 
financial crisis is the high unemployment 
rate, particularly youth and long-term unem-
ployment. There is a need to develop inclusive 
growth policies to reduce different types of in-
equalities that have emerged alongside the cri-
sis. Some of these social issues are addressed by 
Haley Robinson in her article “The Changing 
Role of Women in Portugal.”
 Continuing in the area of social reform 
but on a more specific topic, the article “De-
criminalization of Drugs in Portugal: A Con-
troversial Experiment for Public Health” by 
Kathryn Kundrod offers some important re-
flections on a theme often absent from the po-
litical agenda.
 Green growth is clearly an important ob-
jective for long-term sustainability. The article 
“Renewable Electricity: Lighting the Way or 
Casting a Shadow?” by Catherine Withers is 
particularly relevant in a context where there 
is a clear need for changing policies worldwide. 
 Overall, this set of articles offers a very in-
teresting perspective on the Portuguese econo-
my, evaluating threats and opportunities, with 
insights looking forward. As suggested by the 
poet, a changing world demands new qualities. 
This collective work from the Lehigh Univer-
sity Martindale Student Associates represents 
a relevant contribution to our debate on the 
changes that need to be made in the Portu-
guese economy to assure long-term perfor-
mance improvement. 
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